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Perceptual experience is often conceived as a a foundation for human knowledge. Many philosophers hold that experience can serve this role only because it has certain non-conceptual aspects. This view raises problems that have taken many forms throughout the history of philosophy. Given hat human knowledge is conceptual, how can the non-conceptual aspects of experience be of relevance to it? And if they cannot, how can experience be a foundation for knowledge? Contents McDowell and the Openness of Experience Tarjei Mandt Larsen Seeing, Certainty and Apprehension Kevin Mullgian Discursive and Non-Discursive Thought Eyjolfur Kjalar Emilsson Perceptual Intimacy and Conceptual Inadequacy Frode Kjosavik The Indexicality of Perception and Perceptual Objects Johan Arnt Myrstad Non-Conceptual Meaning in Music Arild Pedersen Davidson and the Role of Error Mariann Solberg Perception and the Origin of Conceptual Content John Richard Sageng Causality and Cognition: Aristotele on the Material Basis for Conscious Perception Hallvard Fossheim Unipub forlag. Order here. STOLEN TENT Philosophy Series |
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