Perceptual experience is often conceived as a a foundation for human knowledge. Many philosophers hold that experience can serve this role only because it has certain non-conceptual aspects. This view raises problems that have taken many forms throughout the history of philosophy. Given hat human knowledge is conceptual, how can the non-conceptual aspects of experience be of relevance to it? And if they cannot, how can experience be a foundation for knowledge?
McDowell and the Openness of Experience
Tarjei Mandt Larsen
Seeing, Certainty and Apprehension
Discursive and Non-Discursive Thought
Eyjolfur Kjalar Emilsson
Perceptual Intimacy and Conceptual Inadequacy
The Indexicality of Perception and Perceptual Objects
Johan Arnt Myrstad
Non-Conceptual Meaning in Music
Davidson and the Role of Error
Perception and the Origin of Conceptual Content
John Richard Sageng
Causality and Cognition: Aristotele on the Material Basis for Conscious Perception
Unipub forlag. Order here.
STOLEN TENT Philosophy Series